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As you are no doubt aware, the French Government intends to resume the testing of nuclear weapons in the S. Pacific at Moruroa Atoll in September. We are writing to you because we believe that such testing poses an unacceptable risk, both now and in the future to human health and to the wider environment. In addition, it poses a threat to nuclear non- proliferation.
The implications of the planned testing programme have not been examined in relation to the current condition of the test site. Previous scientific missions, even with access to limited data, have raised serious questions about the safety of the testing programme. We, therefore, believe that there is an urgent need to carry out a thorough geological, hydrological, biological and radiological assessment of the site in order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of past tests and the likely impact of a resumption of the testing programme. This needs to be carried out prior to any further testing.
Accordingly we are circulating with this letter the broad outline of an independent work programme which we believe to be a minimum required to establish the true situation. We hope that you will be able to lend your support to this programme and join the list of signatories that believe this work to be essential. We intend to forward this to the French Authorities in due course.
In addition, we are in the process of constructing a more detailed work programme based around the general outline. If you have any detailed suggestions for work which would improve the scope of the proposed study or any additions or refinements to it we would be very grateful to hear from you on this also. Again, the detailed proposal will be submitted to the French Authorities.
We hope that you will feel able to lend us your support or to contribute expertise to construct the detailed programme of study. In addition, if you know of any other colleagues who would also be prepared to lend their support, we would be very happy to hear from them. Please contact Paul Johnston or David Santillo at the address above, or alternatively through the Internet at address: Exeter.lab@Green2.greenpeace.org
RATIONALE FOR A PROGRAMME OF STUDY TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING AT MORUROA AND FANGATAUFAThe president of France, M. Jacques Chirac has recently announced that France intends to resume the testing of nuclear weapons at Moruroa and Fangataufa Atolls in the South Pacific during September. At the same time he has stated that the testing programme carried out by France had no ecological consequences and that independent scientists would be invited to observe the tests to prove their safety.
Nonetheless, observation of the tests alone is simply not adequate as an overall assessment of the possible consequences of resuming the testing regime. Very few data exist concerning the impact upon the atolls and their environs of previous testing programmes carried out at the sites. The data that do exist indicate grounds for serious concerns, both about the integrity of the atoll structure and the containment of the radioactive products of the weapons testing.
To date there have been more than 120 underground tests in these locations. The degree to which the fission products from these tests will be contained within the structure of the atoll in the long term is highly uncertain. Effectively, the two sites comprise an unregulated dump for radioactive wastes from these explosions. This has never been subjected to a full, independent evaluation. Several scientific missions to the atolls, all of which have been described as "exploratory" by the scientists concerned, have taken place. A common theme to the conclusions reached in these studies is a call for greater openness and constant vigilance at the test sites. Moreover, the data produced by at least two of these missions raise serious questions about the short and long term containment of radioactivity within the atoll.
The scientists taking part in these missions were well respected and of international stature. They were led by Haroun Tazieff, Prof. H. Atkinson and Cmdr Jacques Cousteau respectively. Nonetheless, time constraints and logistic restrictions severely limited the scope of these studies and the information obtained was, thus, in each case only of a preliminary nature. Very little substantial information, therefore, has made its way to the public or scientific communities as a result of the work. Further, despite their limited and hence inconclusive nature, the French Government has used these studies to justify continuing their testing programme and to assert that the tests are safe and contained.
Considering this, there is clearly a need for a comprehensive exhaustive and independent scientific study prior to any further tests. It is important to recognise that such a study does not require the disclosure of militarily sensitive information concerning the weapons themselves. Hence there is no conflict between the needs of a robust scientific programme of work and the perceived need to preserve militarily sensitive information. Obviously, however, the authorities will need to grant access to both sites but it must be emphasised that the nature of the required programme does not conflict with the interests of national security.
An environmental assessment of the atolls should apply, as a basic minimum, the same criteria as applied to civilian sites in relation to the short and long term possibilities of environmental damage, radioactive escapes and needs for radiological protection. In addition, this assessment should fully acknowledge that there are inherent uncertainties in any predictive exercise and that gaps exist in the data. Accordingly, a precautionary approach to future environmental protection of the atolls and the wider environment is required where full weight is given to scientific uncertainty and ignorance of the long term consequences of the tests.
It must be recognised by the French Government that the time required for a genuine, comprehensive environmental assessment is considerably greater than would be required for simple observation of the tests at the time that they are carried out. The comprehensive nature of the work required implies not only a long lead time for preparation and logistics but also sufficient time to execute the actual fieldwork.
It must also be recognised that a genuine environmental assessment can only take place if there is no restriction on access to the study areas. This must be facilitated by the French Government. Additionally, the Authorities must be prepared to provide the most detailed and recent data available on the structure and geomorphology of the atolls together with the best data available concerning the radioactive inventory present. Such information would pose no threat to the national security of France but is indispensable to the conduct of the study.
Finally, a multidisciplinary approach will be required. This is likely to be a cost intensive process, a judgment supported by the large sums of money required to conduct surveys of nuclear weapons production sites in the United States. The resourcing for the programme will need to be supported with substantial financing and logistic support from the French Government.
The following programme of work suggested in this document is designed to take into account various of the concerns attached to past and planned future weapons testing. It is designed to be a repeatable exercise so that the effect of future testing can be gauged against present environmental conditions. Central to the concerns are the possibility of leakage of radionuclides from the test sites. Hence the programme should address in detail the possibility that leakage has already occurred and the possibility that it might do so in the future bearing in mind the extremely long half-life of many of the radioactive isotopes involved.It must be recognised by the French Government that the scientific integrity of any programme based solely upon observation at the time of testing is highly suspect.
The programme should include inter alia the following elements and a decision on whether to recommence testing or not should be based on consideration of the results of this programme, notwithstanding other political aspects (ie. nuclear proliferation and related issues):
1) A full survey of the topography of the atoll using side scan sonar and a remotely operated vehicle equipped with cameras and testing instruments. This will establish the nature and occurrence of any externally visible fissures. These may be present in the basaltic parent material laid down by aerial and submarine volcanic activity in which tests are conducted, or in the overlying transition zone, dolomite and limestone strata. In turn this will allow an evaluation, supplemented by empirical measurement of actual concentrations of radionuclides, of the potential for release of nucliides from the internal reef structure.
2) A shallow seismic testing programme to establish the degree to which the internal integrity of the atoll structure has been compromised by previous testing. Such a programme would provide some information on the degree of internal fissuring of the parent and overlying materials and also contribute substantially to an evaluation of the potential for radioactive leakage to occur from the atoll structure. Together with data produced from the visual/sonar inspection an evaluation is then possible of the potential for serious structural changes in the atoll produced by future weapons testing.
3) A comprehensive sampling campaign to investigate the concentrations of radionuclides in fish, planktonic organisms, sediments and coralline structures. Where feasible, samples will also be taken from various locations outside the atoll to provide data on existing background levels. This exercise will help to establish whether radioactive materials have been released. It will also give some indications of the quantities of radiation released. By using coralline materials and analysing the radionuclides present in the skeletal matrix, it may be possible to establish the timing and approximate magnitude of releases of radionuclides in the past.
4) An exhaustive determination of the hydrology of the atoll and reef structure. This should determine the general water movement through the various strata of the atoll. Knowledge of water movements through the system, the interaction between fresh and salt water in the reef system, the presence and size of freshwater lens systems will allow a more precise estimate of the speed at which radionuclides may be carried to the outside environment as a result of failure of these substances to be contained within the reef structure. In particular the hydrological relationships of fissures and faults identified by 1 & 2 above and the remnant test chambers and the boreholes leading to them is a high priority.
5) Following these evaluations, an epidemiological study integrating retrospective and prospective elements should be initiated to assess the local and regional health impacts of the testing regime, past and present.2 above and
6) A comparison of the potential for radionuclide release from the testing sites should be made with standards routinely enforced for initiated civil nuclear installations.
Should a decision to resume testing be taken after this programme is carried out and its results fully considered, it should be agreed that the programme be repeated immediately after the test series has taken place.